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minor in the face of that had refused counsel and stated that defendant
wanted to enter a plea of guilty, the situation would be vastly different
than it is as disclosed by the record and would have compelled
affirmance ...
Everything that the Oklahoma court stated was necessary for affirmance is present and on record in the principal case. Clearly, the right to
counsel may be waived by the parent of an accused minor.
The Vermont statute controlling the present decision is almost unique. 16
However, it is clear; it requires that a guardian ad litem must be
appointed. In absence of a showing of antagonism between the accused and
the guardian, the guardian should be permitted to waive the accused's right
to counsel. It is pointless to require such an appointment and then to
restrict unreasonably the power of the person appointed. It appears that
the underlying purpose of the statute is to enable the courts to deal more
effectively with the accused minor. Another aim of the statute is to provide
advice and protection for the minor. The guardian, be he parent or other
person, presumably is more experienced and more competent. To say
that he may not waive counsel is to render his appointment meaningless.
In conclusion, therefore, the court was correct in holding that a minor's
right to counsel may be waived by a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant
to the statute.
Michael H. Hynes

FEDERAL COURTS

-

CHANGE OF VENUE -

TRANSFEREE DISTRICT

COURT BOUND TO APPLY LAW OF TRANSFEROR STATE.

Van Dusen v. Barrack (U.S. 1964)
Plaintiffs, personal representatives of victims of a Massachusetts plane
crash, brought actions in the United States Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania against the airline, various manufacturers and the United
States. Judge Van Dusen, acting pursuant to section 1404(a) of the
United States Judicial Code,' granted defendants' motion for transfer of
venue to the District Court of Massachusetts. In deciding that such transfer
was justified he failed to consider whether the laws and conflict of laws
rules of either Pennsylvania or Massachusetts would be applicable to the
16. There is only one other statute which is similar. CONN. GtN. STAT. ANN. tit. 54
§ 199 (1957). A Florida statute requires only notice to parents. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 932.38 (1959), noted 14 U. FLA. L. Rev. 290 (1962) and 16 U. MIAMI L. REv.

204 (1962).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.
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action when transferred. The Court of Appeals, on a writ of mandamus,
reversed and held that transfer could be granted only if at the time the
2
suits were brought, plaintiffs were qualified to sue in Massachusetts.
The Supreme Court reversed both decisions and remanded to the district
court holding that section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code and rule 17(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be so interpreted that the
transferee district court, after a change of venue, is generally bound to
apply the law of the state of the transferor; and that the district court was
in error in ignoring several factors which stem from this conclusion in
determining whether or not to grant the motion.3 Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct 805 (1964).
The problem in this case was generated by an attempt to mesh two
major policies applicable to litigation in the federal courts. The Erie
Doctrine, 4 clarified by the Court in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,'
demanded that uniformity between state and federal court decisions in the
same state be an axiom in the federal courts. Contrasted with this approach,
a plaintiff may indulge in federal forum shopping without fear of an outright dismissal, regardless of the inconvenience of the chosen forum, so
long as venue and jurisdiction are proper. In spite of the inevitable differences in decisions between federal forums sitting in different states, no
problem should arise when a motion to transfer is granted. Courts applying
conflict of laws rules should invariably reach the same result. However,
state courts have precluded the Utopia either by categorizing certain foreign
law as procedural, which they need not apply, or by a more forthright
route, contending that local public policy forbids application of the undesirable law. Federal courts bound by Klaxon must, of course, reach the
same conclusion. Previous lower court decisions, if aware of the issue at
all, were almost unanimous in trying to protect the advantage which a
plaintiff had secured by starting suit in a particular forum, even if an
6
extremely inconvenient one.
The major complicating factor here was that it was not altogether
clear what attitude the Pennsylvania state courts would take as to the
Massachusetts limitation of damages in wrongful death actions. 7 Quite
understandably, however, the court avoided both this question as well as
the question of whether a failure by Pennsylvania courts to apply the
damage limitation in an action that arose in Massachusetts was unconstitu2. Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962).
3. This note will not consider the reversal of the Circuit Court's opinion on the
interpretation of "where the action might have been brought."
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
5. 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941) (the federal court must apply the conflict
of law rules of the state in which it sits).
6. Headrick v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950) (the law of
the transferor state applies) ; Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 177 F. Supp. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (transfer was granted only on stipulation that defendant would not
assert shorter statute of limitations of transferee state). See generally, 1 BARRONz &
HOLTZOFF § 86.1 (Wright ed. 1960).
7. Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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tional.8 Recent New York cases 9 and the Restatement1 ° have cast doubts
upon any previous notions of vested rights.
The instant court assumed a rather narrow interpretation of the
transfer statute by regarding it merely as "federal judicial housekeeping"
that authorizes only "a change of courtrooms."" Congress intended to go
no further than to obviate the inconveniences resulting from overgenerous
venue provisions; therefore, a conclusion that there would be a change of
law would actually frustrate the Congressional intent. Section 1404(a)
would become an instrument for further forum shopping and a judge would
hesitate to transfer an action when he knew the transferee court would
apply different laws, prejudicial to one of the parties. This approach is
quite desirable to prevent a defendant from further forum shopping which,
if permitted, would give him an undue advantage over the plaintiff. Thus
the decision is seen to rest plainly on the concept that the federal court
system is a national and unified tribunal, though bound to administer
justice on a local level according to local law in diversity actions. When
an advantage in the form of transfer of venue, is accorded to a defendant,
every advantage for which plaintiff had chosen a particular forum where
venue and jurisdiction were proper must also be retained. The opposite
suggestion that the transferee court should apply the law of the state in
which it sits because of the Erie Doctrine was rejected offhandedly by the
Supreme Court. Even though the Court, in interpreting Erie, has been
quite adamant in insisting that an identity had to be maintained between
state and federal courts even though differences between federal courts
result, 12 Mr. Justice Goldberg was careful to indicate that the identity to
be maintained was that between the court which decides the case and
the court of the state in which the action was filed. This conclusion is a
natural corollary of a unitary court system and is analogous to a state court's
transfer of an action to another district within the state.
While the decision in the present case solves one facet of the Erie
problem when a motion to. transfer is made, it creates the rather anomalous
possibility of a vast disparity between the measure of damages recoverable
by those who sued in Massachusetts and those who sued in Pennsylvania
because of injuries arising out of the same tort. This pecularity will be
heightened if the trial court should grant the defendants' motion to transfer
to the District Court of Massachusetts. One possible solution would
appear to be an application of state law requiring a dismissal of the action
on the grounds of forum non conveniens following state law.' 3 However,
even if the state allowed a dismissal by its own courts, it is clear from this
8. Cf. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
dcnicd. 372 U.S. 912, 83 S.Ct. 726 (1963).
9. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
10. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft, 1963).
11. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636, 84 S.Ct. 805, 819 (1964).
12. Klaxon Co. v. Stenton Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941).
13. See generally Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHt.
L. Rgv. 405 (1955) ; Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction,
27 U, CHi. L. Rtv. 341 (1960).
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